Veri able Signature Sharing (V S ) was introduced by Franklin and Reiter in 20]. V S enables the recipient of a digital signature, who is not necessarily the original signer, to share such signature among n proxies so that a subset of them can later reconstruct it. In 20] e cient protocols were given for RSA, Rabin, ElGamal, Schnorr and DSS signatures. However their RSA and Rabin V S protocols were subsequently broken and their DSS V S lacks a formal proof of security. We present new protocols for RSA, Rabin and DSS V S . Our protocols are e cient and provably secure and can tolerate the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies. The RSA V S scheme is based on a completely novel approach. The recipient of the signature will not share such string using conventional secret sharing schemes, but instead will simply encrypt it using a threshold cryptosystem, i.e. a public key whose matching secret key is kept shared at the proxies. She will then also provide the proxies with a proof that such ciphertext indeed contains a signature. The crux of the problem was to design a threshold cryptosystem that would make such proof e cient. We present several variants of our basic scheme, one of which requires no interaction between the recipient of the signature and the proxies to establish such a proof and one in which the reconstruction is completely non-interactive. The RSA V S scheme can be easily adapted to Rabin's signatures. The DSS V S scheme is a modi ed version of the ElGamal V S scheme from 20] which allows for a proof of security. The main application of V S is the incorporation of digital cash into multiparty protocols, e.g. cash escrow and secure distributed auctions. Our protocols thus provide simple, e cient and secure solutions for those applications. Furthermore we believe that some of our techniques are of independent interest. Some of the by-products of our main result are: a new threshold cryptosystem, a new undeniable signature scheme and a way to create binding RSA cryptosystems.
Introduction
The concept of Veri able Signature Sharing (V S ) was introduced by Franklin and Reiter in 20] . V S enables the recipient of a digital signature, who is not necessarily the original signer, to share such signature among n proxies so that a subset of them can later reconstruct it. A V S protocol is divided in a sharing phase and a recover phase. At the end of the sharing phase each proxy can verify that a valid signature for the given document can be reconstructed. At the end of the recover phase such signature is reconstructed no matter what a malicious subset of proxies may do. Previous Work. In 20] e cient protocols were given for RSA, Rabin, ElGamal, Schnorr and DSS signatures. However their RSA and Rabin V S protocols were subsequently broken in 8]. Also their DSS V S achieves only an heuristic form of security.
In 4] Burmester shows an unifying approach to V S based on homomorphism of secret sharing schemes. The approach is very elegant and also secure. However its generality does not yield extremely e cient protocols when applied to typical real-life signature schemes.
Thus the question of e cient and provably secure V S schemes for RSA/Rabin and DSS was still open. Our Contribution. In this paper we present new protocols for RSA, Rabin and DSS V S . Our protocols are e cient and provably secure. They can tolerate a malicious sharer (who tries to share something di erent from a valid signature) and the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies during sharing or reconstruction time. Motivation. It is important to notice that V S can be solved in theory using known cryptographic techniques for zero-knowledge proofs 31, 28] and multiparty computation 29, 3, 6] . However these solutions are hardly practical. We focus instead on practical solutions since there are several real-life applications which would greatly bene t from secure and e cient V S protocols. In order to motivate the problem we present rst some of the most interesting applications in which V S can be used.
The main application of V S is the incorporation of digital cash into multiparty protocols. Consider the example of cash escrow: digital cash can be represented as the bank's signature on a digital coin or e-check. By using V S nancial institutions can divide the cash among a set of authorities so that only through the cooperation of a threshold of them it is possible to spend it, yet the authorities can verify that they collectively have the cash. A related application is secure distributed auctions: bidders to an auction may be required to veri ably share a signature on a check for the amount of their bid. This way it will be impossible for the winner of the bid to default (since the proxies can reconstruct his check), while the payments of the losers will never be recovered.
More generally V S is useful when a signed document should become valid only under certain conditions. By veri ably sharing the signature, one makes sure that the signature will be recovered if and only if such conditions are created. Other Applications. We believe that parts of our solution are relevant on their own.
For example, in Section 3 we present a new threshold cryptosystem which is possibly of independent interest. V S protocols are somewhat related to undeniable signatures (introduced by Chaum in 5]), i.e. signatures that can be veri ed only with the help of the signer. RSA-based undeniable signatures were recently introduced in 26]. Our RSA construction can be seen as an alternative to 26] (though admittedly a less e cient scheme).
Interestingly the structure of our RSA V S protocol can also be used to construct binding RSA cryptosystems. In 42] the concept of binding cryptography was introduced. In a binding public-key cryptosystem the sender encrypts a message under both the public key of the receiver and the public key of a third party and prove in (non-interactive) ZK that the two ciphertexts contain the same message. In 42] a scheme for binding ElGamal was presented. We show that our RSA V S scheme can be used to construct binding RSA public key encryptions.
Details about these applications can be found in Section 6.
Overview of our solution
Let Bob be the signer, Alice the recipient of the signature and P 1 ; : : :; P n the proxies (see Section 2 for a detailed description of the model).
The RSA scheme. Let (N B ; v B ) be Bob's RSA public key. The matching signing key is s B such that s B v B = 1 mod (N B ). We assume the standard \hash-and-sign" paradigm (although our technique extends to other schemes like 2]). Alice receives a message M from Bob and Bob's signature S = m sB mod N B on it where m = H(M) for some collisionresistant hash function H. Alice wants to veri ably share the value S among the proxies P 1 ; : : :; P n . That is, at the end of the sharing phase the proxies must be assured that they hold shares of Bob's signature on m (from now on we will drop the hashing step since it is irrelevant to our purposes).
Our new RSA V S scheme is based on a completely novel approach. Alice will not share S using conventional secret sharing schemes, but instead she will encrypt S using a threshold cryptosystem, i.e. a public key whose matching secret key is kept shared at the proxies. That is, she gives to the proxies the values m and C S = E EK (S) where E is a public key encryption scheme and the decryption key DK is shared at the proxies, i.e. each proxy P i has a share DK i of a t-out-of-n secret sharing of DK. At this point all we need is a mechanism to convince the proxies that the decryption of C S is really the signature S on m without revealing S.
The crux of the problem was to design a threshold cryptosystem that would make such proof e cient. The main idea here is to use the ElGamal encryption scheme 13, 14] over the same composite modulus N B over which the signature was computed. This will allows us to construct e cient methods to convince the proxies that the ciphertext contains the signature. We present two such methods.
(1) One is for Alice to provide a zero-knowledge proof 31] that C S contains S. We present an e cient ZK proof for this task.
(2) The other variant consists on the proxies using their private key to decrypt a messagê C S publicly computable from C S . If such decryption equals the message m, then the proxies are guaranteed that C S contains the signature S.
Method (1) is more e cient for the proxies, but requires interaction with Alice. Method (2) is more e cient for Alice and requires no interaction between her and the proxies.
The solution is described in detail in Section 4
The DSS scheme. The DSS V S scheme is a modi ed version of the ElGamal V S scheme from 20] which allows for a proof of security. The solution is described in Section 5
Related Work
Some ideas in our new RSA V S scheme have appeared previously in the literature although in di erent contexts and with di erent usage. Performing secret sharing by encrypting a value with a symmetric key that is shared among the proxy appeared rst in 32] as a way to shorten the size of shares in computationally secure secret sharing schemes. The speci c idea of using threshold cryptosystems to \bootstrap" secret sharings appeared (exclusively for e ciency reasons) in 9, 22] .
The idea of encrypting a signature and then proving in ZK that the ciphertext contains a valid signature has appeared in several places. In 10] it was proposed as a general paradigm to construct undeniable signatures but the speci c e cient solutions work only for ElGamal-like signatures. In 1] this technique was used to construct fair exchange of digital signatures between two parties using an o -line trusted center. The paper is not concerned with using a threshold cryptosystem for encrypting the signature. Moreover they present general solutions for RSA and DSS signatures using any kind of public-key encryption but employing ine cient binary cut-and-choose ZK proofs which require a number of public-key operations which is proportional to the security parameter.
Stadler in 41] uses ElGamal over a composite to veri ably encrypt e-roots. But when it comes to share such encryptions, his scheme can only deal with additive access structures, thus resulting in an O(n t ) exponential blow-up to achieve a t-out-of-n threshold scheme.
The construction of an ElGamal-like threshold cryptosystem over a composite modulus uses techniques from the areas of threshold 16, 12, 11, 17, 24] and proactive 18, 19, 38] RSA signature schemes. In particular we combine the techniques of 19, 38] in order to improve e ciency.
It is important also to remind the reader of the di erence between V S and related cryptographic objects (see 20] for a good discussion of this issue). V S is related but di erent from threshold signature schemes: in the latter the secret key is shared so that a set of n people can produce signatures if a threshold of t cooperates. Notice that a threshold signature scheme trivially gives a V S scheme when the signature sharer coincides with the signer. But in general this is not true. V S also bear some relationship to fair public-key cryptosystems (FPKC) 34] in which one has to share a secret key and prove that the shared secret is indeed the inverse of a given public key. Indeed both V S and FPKC are examples of structured VSS protocols (to use the terminology in 34]), i.e. veri able secret sharing protocols in which the dealer has to prove some additional property about the secret being shared (and not just that such a unique secret exists).
Preliminaries

The Model
We assume there are three entities. The signer (which in the following we will usually call Bob), the recipient (Alice) and a set of n proxies. The V S protocol will be between Alice and the proxies and must not involve Bob.
We assume that Alice and the proxies are connected by a full network of private channels and by a broadcast channel. These assumptions allow us to focus on a high-level description of the protocols. However, it is worth noting that these abstractions can be substituted with standard cryptographic techniques for privacy, commitment and authentication. In some of the variations of our protocols it will not be necessary to have private channels between Alice and the proxies.
We assume that there exist an adversary A who can corrupt Alice and at most t of the proxies. By corrupting a player, A can read his memory and cause him to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. We assume the adversary is static i.e. the set of corrupted players is decided at the beginning of the computation of a protocol.
Finally we assume communication to be synchronous. We do however allow for rushing adversaries, i.e. adversaries who decide the messages of the bad players at round R after having seen the messages of the good players at the same round.
Notation. In the rest of the paper n will denote the number of proxies and L = n!. If N is a composite modulus, we denote with G 0 an element of maximal order in Z N and with G = G L 2 0 mod N. DLog G A mod N is the discrete log in base G of A modulo N.
De nition
We follow the ideas in the de nition of V S presented in 20], although we believe our formalization to be simpler and more rigorous. V S consists of a pair of protocols ( Share , Recover ) for Alice and the proxies. The input of Share for all the players is a message m and the public veri cation key V K of the signer. The secret input for Alice is a signature S of m under the signer's key. The output of Share for each proxy P i is a value S i , which can assume the special value S i = ! denoting that the proxy has rejected the sharing. The protocol Recover is then run on the output of Share by the proxies.
We say the V S = ( Share , Recover ) is a Veri We accept a negligible probability (over the coin tosses of the players) that these conditions are violated. Informally, completeness means that if Alice really shares the right signature, then, no matter what malicious proxies do, the signature will be recovered at the end. Soundness means that if Alice is malicious, then either she will be caught trying to cheat (i.e. sharing something di erent from a valid signature) or she will share a valid signature anyway. Security nally says that a run of Share gives the adversary no information he could not compute on his own from the message and the public key. In particular (unless the signature scheme is not secure) no information about the signature S.
Computational Assumptions
Our RSA V S protocol uses the so- 30] , means that it is impossible for an observer to distinguish between the encryption of two messages). If the message space is larger than the group generated by G then the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme is a seemingly stronger assumption than the DDH.
Tools
We will use the polynomial-based t-out-of-n secret sharing due to Shamir 39] . Let q be a prime: given a secret 2 Z q , the dealer chooses at random a polynomial f(z) = + Notice that the value of the secret is only computationally secure, e.g., the value g mod p is leaked. To avoid this problem it is possible to use Pedersen's VSS 36] which protects the secret in an information-theoretic sense. In this implementation the dealer chooses a second t-degree polynomial f 0 = P j b j z j and sends the value i = f 0 (i) mod p to player P i in addition to the share i as above. The dealer then commits to each coe cient of the polynomials f; f 0 as follows: he publishes the values j = g aj h bj mod p where h is an element in the subgroup generated by g such that the discrete log of h in base g is unknown. This will allow the players to check the received shares by checking that g i h i = Q j i j j mod p.
At revealing time the players are required to reveal both i and i and the above equation is used to validate the shares. It is possible to prove that the VSS fails if and only if the dealer or of the players is able to compute the discrete log of h in base g. Notice that the value of the secret is unconditionally protected since the only value revealed is 0 = g h b0 .
3 A new threshold cryptosystem Our RSA V S scheme relies on a new ElGamal-based threshold cryptosystem which we present in this section. We believe this new threshold cryptosystem to be of independent interest. Although the construction of this ElGamal-based threshold cryptosystem is new, the techniques used in this section appears in several papers related to threshold 16, 12, 17, 24] and proactive 18, 19, 38] RSA signature schemes.
Threshold Cryptosystems. Let E be a public key encryption scheme. A threshold cryptosystem T E for a scheme E distributes the operation of key generation and decryption among a set of n parties P 1 ; : : :; P n . That is, T E is de ned by two protocols: T-Key-Gen a randomized protocol that returns as public output the public encryption key EK and as private output for player P i a value DK i such that DK 1 ; : : :; DK n constitute a t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing of DK. T-Decrypt each player P i takes as public input a ciphertext C = E EK (M) and as secret input his share DK i and returns as public output the message M
The two protocols should be secure i.e. they should function correctly and reveal no extra information even in the presence of an adversary that corrupts maliciously up to t players 1 .
In particular notice that the private key DK should not be exposed during T-Decrypt.
Formal de nitions for threshold cryptosystems appear in Appendix A. An example of a threshold cryptosystem for ElGamal over a prime modulus can be found in 35] . In this section we show how to extend that construction to a composite modulus. A Threshold Cryptosystem for ElGamal over a composite. There are several complications that arise from trying to generalize the approach in 35] to work for ElGamal modulo a composite.
First of all we will require for our application that the modulus N will be given as a parameter to the key generation protocol 2 without its factorization. This implies that the value (N) is unknown to the parties who have to jointly choose and share X. Our threshold cryptosystem overcomes this problem using techniques discovered by 19] for the application of proactive RSA.
Feldman's VSS over a composite
First we present how to modify Feldman's VSS to work modulo a composite of unknown factorization. This protocol was discovered in 19]. They used it as a crucial tool to refresh shares of a proactive RSA signature scheme. We slightly modi ed it to work as a component of our key generation protocol. The main idea behind the protocol is for the the dealer to share the secret over the integers (since he doesn't know (N)). The coe cients of the sharing polynomial must be chosen large enough to statistically hide information (this is evident from the proof of security). The protocol appears in Figure 1 . The following Lemma is from 19]. The proof is mostly based on a similar proof that appears in 38].
Lemma 1 Feldman-Z N -VSS is a VSS of fault-tolerance t for any t; n such that n > 2t. Proof First of all Feldman-Z N -VSS inherits all the correctness properties of a VSS from Feldman's original VSS (that is, the shares determine a unique secret at the end of the sharing phase). We need however to prove that an adversary controlling t players has no information about the secret except for the value G . We prove this by showing that the view of the adversary at the end of the sharing phase can be produced by a simulator on input the value 0 = G mod N. Without loss of generality we can assume that the adversary corrupts the rst t players P 1 ; : : :; P t . First of all we show that the distribution of t shares of a secret with polynomial f(z) is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of t shares from sharing a random secret with polynomial r(z). We prove this by proving that with high probability there is a sharing of a random value 2 ?N 2 : : :N 2 ] using a polynomial r with integer coe cients 1 Notice that we are talking about robust protocols that work in the presence of malicious faults. Unless otherwise noted when we say \secure" we mean also \robust". If the check fails he asks that the dealer makes i public. If more than t player make this request the dealer is disquali ed. 4. The dealer reveals i for the players who asked and the previous check is carried out on all public shares. If it fails the dealer is disquali ed. Reconstruction Phase. Player P i broadcasts i . Accept those for which Equation (1) t N which is negligible. Now we have to show the full simulation of Feldman-Z N -VSS. The simulator receives the value 0 = G and it has to produce an indistinguishable view for the adversary. The simulator shares a random value with a random polynomial r(z) and gives to the adversary the t shares i = r(i) mod N for i = 1; : : :; t. As we proved above the distribution of these values is statistically close to the real one. Now the simulator has to produce the public where the i;k are known constants. the only problem now to compute G ak is the presence of the fractions since we cannot extract roots modulo N. But recall that we de ned G = G L 2 0 . Thus
Notice that all the exponents are integers now.
Key Generation Protocol
We are now ready to show the key generation protocol for the threshold ElGamal scheme. The general idea follows the one of Pedersen 35] for the case of discrete-log cryptosystems in a prime eld. Each player P i shares a random value x i via Feldman's VSS. The secret key x will be the sum of those random values, while the public key y = g x is easily computable from the public information of the VSS protocols. The key generation continues by having each player sum up the shares he received to create his own share of the secret key for a t-out-of-n secret sharing.
There are two di culties with the above approach however:
Since each Feldman's VSS reveals g xi it is possible for a rushing adversary to choose the x i 's of the bad players so that a speci c y = g x will appear. Even if the adversary were not rushing, it would be possible for her during the complain phase to \pull out" some bad players (by having them disquali ed) in order to a ect the value of y. At the end it is not possible to prove that the pair x; y is built with the right (uniform)
distribution. This problem was rst noticed by 25]. Their solution, which we are going to employ in this paper, is to perform an information-theoretically secure VSS rst for x i (for example Pedersen's VSS) and then on top of that (using the same sharing polynomial) perform the checks required by the Feldman's VSS. This has the e ect of forcing the decision of the adversary when the x i 's are information-theoretically secure and thus the choice of the adversary is independent from the ones of the good players. When working over a composite modulus the threshold decryption protocol is unnecessarily cumbersome if the key is represented in a t-out-of-n fashion. Thus we follow a di erent approach. Each player will keep as a share of the secret key the random value he originally shared: this is a (n?1)-out-of-n secret sharing. The shares a player received during Feldman-Z N -VSS will be used for backup in case some other player fails during the decryption protocol. This paradigm was introduced by 38] and called share-backup.
The protocol TEG-Key-Gen (for Threshold ElGamal Key Generation) appears in gure 2.
Decryption Protocol
We are now left to show the decryption protocol. The approach is the same as the decryption protocol modulo a prime in 35], but it uses the techniques from 19, 38] , to make it work modulo a composite. The idea is to get a partial decryption from each player by exponentiating the ciphertext to his own additive (not threshold!) share of the secret key. Since the secret key is the sum of the additive shares, the product of the partial decryptions will be the correct decryption. To prevent bad players from contributing bad partial decryption we force them to prove in ZK that they are correct with respect to the witnesses generated during the key generation protocol. The ZK proof for this task is described Theorem 1 TEG = (TEG-Key-Gen, TEG-Decrypt) is a secure threshold cryptosystem for ElGamal over a composite with fault-tolerance t for any t; n such that n > 2t.
Proof First of all we have to prove that the distribution of the public key generated by the protocol is \almost" the same as if it was generated by a centralized user. The distribution of Y is induced by the distribution of X mod phi(N) (since ord(G) is a divisor of (N)). In the centralized case X is chosen in Z N with uniform probability. This results in a distribution which is statistically close to uniform for X mod (N). So we need to prove ] and consider the polynomial f i (z) = Lx i + a i1 z + : : :+ a it z t . Player P i performs an unconditionally secure VSS of x i using sharing polynomial f i (z) computed over the integers. Let Good be the set of players who are not disquali ed at the end of this step. 2. Player P i broadcasts i0 = G xi mod N and ik = G aik mod N. 3. Let x ji = f j (i) be the integer player P i received during step 1. Player P i checks that
If the check fails P i opens the commitment to the share he received in Step 1 and proves that P j is cheating. 4. Each P j caught cheating on the previous step is exposed. That is the value x j is reconstructed using the VSS of step 1. The value j0 is reset to G xj mod N. 5. The public key is set to Y = Q i2Good i0 mod N (including the exposed values). The private share of player P i is the vector (x i ; fx ji g j2Good ). that when X is generated by the protocol, X mod (N) has a distribution which is also statistically close to uniform. Here X = P i2Good x i , where some of the x i 's are under the control of the adversary. In other words we can write X = X A + X H mod (N) where X A is chosen by the adversary while X H is determined by the honest players. It is important to notice that X A can follow any arbitrary distribution but it is independent from X H since the adversary decides on it at the end of the Pedersen's VSS when she has no information about the x i 's chosen by the honest players. Thus we can consider X A as a xed constant and it is enough to prove that X H is distributed almost uniformly over Z (N ) . Since we can \ x" any of the components of the vector it turns out that we can upper bound
Thus the di erence between the distribution of X H and the uniform distribution over (N) is at most 1=N t which is negligible.
Also the correctness of the decryption protocol should be obvious. Since X = P i2Good x i we have that A X = Q i2Good A xi . Thus, unless a bad player passes the ZK proof with an incorrect partial decryption (which happens with negligible probability), the message is correctly decrypted.
We need to prove simulatability now. Assume w.l.o.g. that A corrupts players P 1 ; : : :; P t . The simulator S works as follows. First it simulates a run of TEG-Key-Gen that produces Y as public key. It runs step 1 of TEG-Key-Gen for the good players sharing valuesx i and receives the sharing of the players controlled by A. At this point the simulator knows which of those players are in the Good set and what are the values they shared (since S controls more than t players.) Let Y A = Q i2Good;i2f1;:::;tg G xi be the component of the key generated by the players controlled by A. S now simulates step 2 as follows: for players P t+1 ; : : :; P n?1 just follows the protocol instructions. For player P n he broadcasts^ n;0 ;^ n;1 ; : : :;^ n;t such
Equation (2) is satis ed by the shares held by the players controlled by A. S can do this via \extrapolation in the exponent" since there are only t shares held by the corrupted players and because in step 1 the previous VSS was information theoretically secure.
The output of the simulation is clearly Y and the simulated view of the adversary is actually identically distributed to the view of a real execution. . For players P t+1 ; : : :; P n?1 the simulator can run the ZK proof since he knowsx i . For P n the simulator runs a simulation of the ZK proof (notice that the theorem being proven is true, but the simulator does not knowx n such thatÂ n = A^x n mod N and 0n = G^x n mod N). Clearly this part of the simulation is indistinguishable from the real one since the only di erence between the simulated and the real view is the ZK proof carried out by players P n . But since the simulation of a ZK proof is indistinguishable from the real proof the whole view also is. 4 Sharing an RSA Signature
The Problem. Let (N B ; v B ) be Bob's RSA public key. The matching signing key is s B such that s B v B = 1 mod (N B ). Alice receives a message m from Bob and Bob's signature S = m sB mod N B on it. Alice wants to veri ably share the value S among the proxies P 1 ; : : :; P n . That is at the end of the sharing the proxies must be assured that they hold a sharing of Bob's signature on m.
The Basic Paradigm. We depart from the approach used by Franklin and Reiter 20] of directly sharing the signature S. Instead we follow the alternative approach to obtain secret sharing using an encryption of the secret with a key which is shared at the proxies. Assume that the proxies have established an instance of a public key encryption scheme E with public key EK and that the matching secret key SK is shared among them in a t-out-of-n fashion. Then all Alice has to do to share S among the proxies is to simply give them the value C S = E PK (S). Indeed t or less proxies have no information about the secret key, thus they cannot decrypt S. In order to achieve the veri ability property we need a proof that C S indeed contains the signature S.
Achieving Veri ability
A first attempt. The above proof could be constructed using general zero-knowledge proof techniques, with a loss of e ciency. We tried to devise direct and e cient proofs for the most commonly used encryption schemes E (e.g. RSA itself and ElGamal) but we
were not able to come up with protocols of acceptable 4 e ciency. Before describing our successful approach, let us give you a hint of the di culties we encountered in this attempt. Assume that the proxies used RSA as their encryption scheme and that their public key was (N P ; e P ) (with matching decryption key being d P ). Alice would have created the ciphertext C S = S eP mod N P and then must have proven in ZK that (CS dP mod N P ) vB mod N B = m without knowing either the factorization of N P or N B ! The interaction between the two groups Z NP and Z NB did not allow us to nd an e cient way to prove the above equation.
Similar problems would arise if the encryption scheme of the proxies was ElGamal with a prime modulus. Achieving Verifiability: a different approach. The above problems were induced by the fact that the ciphertext C S lived in a di erent, mathematically unrelated, group than the one in which the signature S is computed and veri ed. But this needs not necessarily to be the case. Indeed the signature S (created under Bob's public key (N B ; v B )) can be encrypted using an instance of the ElGamal cryptosystem over the same composite modulus N B .
If Y = G X mod N B is the public key of the proxies, Alice will encrypt the signature by choosing a random K 2 Z NB and computing A S = G K mod N B and B S = Y K S mod N B .
This will allow for an e cient veri ability check using the ZK proof in Figure 4 . Alice will be the prover and the proxies will be the veri ers. The protocol is based on 41] with some e ciency improvements (it is not necessary to repeat it several times.) If the Prover has a non-negligible probability of success, it means that after step 1 she must be able to answer a non-negligible fraction of all possible challenges c. In particular the Prover on the same rst message can answer two challenges NB which is negligible. To make the above protocol ZK against any veri er, known techniques 27] can be used. In particular the Veri er can commit to the challenge before the Prover speaks. 5 Notice that we are not constructing an extractor for S so it is not necessary to constructively nd such a pair of challenges, but only to show that they exist Figure 1 . This will guarantee the proxies that they have the correct decryption key to reconstruct S.
To recover S the proxies will run the reconstruction phase of Feldman-Z N -VSS and then use X to decrypt S. The protocol is described in Figure 5 .
Notice that this protocol does not make use of the full threshold cryptosystem we have outlined in the previous section but only of the Feldman-Z N -VSS protocol. In the next section we will show an alternative protocol which uses the full threshold cryptosystem in order to improve the e ciency of the scheme for Alice. To prove soundness rst we notice that since the proxies are connected by a broadcast channel, the honest ones will be in agreement as to accept or reject the sharing. If they all accept the sharing it means that Alice passed the ZK proof, thus the ciphertext contains Bob's signature on the message and Alice passed the sharing phase of Feldman-Z N -VSS which means that the proxies have shares of the correct decryption key which will allow them to reconstruct the signature later. We are left with proving the security of the scheme. Assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary A corrupts 6 the rst t proxies P 1 ; : : :; P t . Here is a simulator S for RSA-Share-1 (rounds are numbered as in the protocol): recall that S works on input m; N B ; v B but not the signature S: Why is the adversary's view from the simulation indistinguishable from the real one?
There is only one di erence: in the real execution A S ; B S is an encryption of S, while in the simulated oneÂ S ;B S is an encryption of 1. To distinguish between the real view and the simulated view would imply to distinguish between encryption of two di erent messages in the ElGamal encryption scheme. which would contradict the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme. Since the basis G is chosen as a power of m this means that both messages (1 and S) are in the group generated by G, thus the DDH implies the semantic security of ElGamal which concludes the proof. A remark is in order with respect to the simulation of the ZK proof in step (2) . The simulation of a ZK proof is guaranteed to be indistinguishable from the real execution when the theorem being proven is true. In this case we are running the simulator on a false theorem (sinceÂ S ;B S is not an encryption of the signature of m. However notice that under the DDH the simulation of the ZK proof must also be indistinguishable when the theorem is false, otherwise such simulator could be used to break the DDH.
An Alternative Protocol
In this section we show a variation of the previous protocol. The reason we present an alternative protocol is to improve the e ciency of the scheme for Alice. Indeed in this scheme we take full advantage of the new threshold cryptosystem described in Section 3.
The main di erence with respect to the previous protocol is that the key generation for the ElGamal scheme is done distributively by the proxies instead than by Alice. This will also allow for a very e cient veri cation that the ciphertext contains the required signature.
Indeed the proxies can verify that the pair (A S ; B S ) is constructed correctly by checking that B vB
i.e. just by running the TEG-Decrypt protocol on the pair (A vB S ; B vB S ). The full protocol appears in Figure 6 . Theorem 3 Under the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption modulo a composite the protocol RSA-V S-1 is a secure V S protocol for RSA with fault-tolerance t, for any n; t with n > 2t.
Proof The correctness of the protocol is based on the correctness of TEG-Decrypt. Since an honest Alice would encrypt the signature, clearly at the end of RSA-Recover the signature will be decrypted.
The soundness of the protocol is also based on the correctness of TEG-Decrypt. Equation (4) is a necessary and su cient condition for (A S ; B S ) to decrypt to the signature. So either all the proxies reject if equation (4) is not satis ed or they will all accept, but then the signature will be decrypted successfully at the end of RSA-Recover .
We are left with proving the security of the scheme. Assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary A corrupts 7 the rst t proxies P 1 ; : : :; P t . Here is a simulator S for RSA-Share-2 (rounds are numbered as in the protocol): recall that S works on input m; N B ; v B but not the signature S:
1. S just sends m; N B ; v B and a randomly chosenr to the proxies. 2. S runs TEG-Key-Gen for the good players, where the basis is set to beĜ = m^r mod N B .
In particular at the end, the values^ 0i =Ĝx i are public. Notice that at the end S knows the sharesx i of the secret key of all the players.
3. S encrypts the value 1 (since it does not know the real signature S) by choosing a randomK 2 R Z N and broadcastingÂ S =ĜK mod N andB S = YK mod N. 4 . At this point the proxies run TEG-Decrypt on (A =Â vB S ; B =B vB S ). In order to get m as the result S will \cheat". Recall the details of TEG-Decrypt. Each proxy will broadcast A i = (A )x i and prove in ZK that it is correct with respect toĜx i generated during TEG-Key-Gen. Notice that S knows the values A i for i = 1; : : :; t. For the proxies P i , i = t + 1; : : :; n ? 1 the simulator will broadcast A i = (A )x i and successfully prove in ZK their correctness. For P n however the simulator will broadcast a value that will make the decryption equal to m: such value is A n = B m Q i<n A i . For P n , the simulator will run the simulation of the ZK proof of correctness.
Why is the adversary's view from the simulation indistinguishable from the real one? There are two di erences:
(a) in the real execution A S ; B S is an encryption of S, while in the simulated oneÂ S ;B S is an encryption of 1.
(b) in the real execution the following values (A = G K ; 0n = G xn ; A n = A xn = G Kxn ) constitute a Di e-Hellman triplet. In the simulated execution (Â =ĜK;^ 0n =Ĝx n ; A n ) is not necessarily a DH triplet. To distinguish between the real view and the simulated view would imply to distinguish either one of these two case. But this contradicts the DDH (for case (a) the reduction is based again on the fact that 1; S are in the group generated by G).
Comments, Variants and Optimizations
Rabin's Signatures. Both the protocols RSA-V S described above can easily be adapted to Rabin's signatures by simply putting v B = 2.
Non-interactive reconstruction. Reconstructing the secret key has the advantage of making the recover protocol non-interactive. It is worth pointing out that even in RSA-V S-2 the recover stage can be implemented by reconstructing the secret key. 7 The case in which Alice is corrupted is easily simulated, S just follows the protocol for the honest proxies.
No-fault mode. Under normal operations, it may be very likely that there are no faults in the system. Let us look at the behavior of our protocol in the case all players are honest. There will be no complaints in Feldman-Z N -VSS. If we choose to expose the secret key in RSA-Recover-2, it can be done without running n recover phases of Feldman-Z N -VSS since the players will rst reveal their correct x i . All runs of TEG-Decrypt will successfully complete without invoking any share-backup. This is very important for step 4 of RSAShare and for RSA-Recover-2. Moreover, in the speci c case of RSA-Recover-2 we can also postpone the ZK proofs of correctness of partial decryptions to after the alleged signature has been reconstructed. Indeed the proxies can verify (using v B ) if they recovered the valid signature S. If so they are done. Otherwise, it means that some of the proxies are contributing incorrect partial decryptions and one must enforce the ZK proofs. Thus with this approach, under normal operation of the system (i.e. when there are no faults), reconstruction using TEG-Decrypt is also non-interactive and requires no ZK proofs. The e ciency gains under normal operation of the system are quite substantial (see below). Saving the Key Generation. In both protocols the generation of the ElGamal key (either by Alice or jointly by the proxies) can Steps 1 and 2 can be moved to a preprocessing stage to make the actual V S protocol faster. Amortizing the Key Generation In protocol RSA-V S-2 the key generation may also be amortized over several V S when the signatures being shared are all under the same modulus N B . Consider the scenario of an electronic auctions in which all the bids must be done by veri ably sharing a check drawn from the same bank. In this case the proxies will receive several signatures all under the same public key N B ; v B and the key generation protocol TEG-Key-Gen can be done once for all the sharings. This means that all the signatures are encrypted under the same key. In turn this implies that if only a single signature has to be reconstructed then the reconstruction must use the decryption protocol instead of recovering the key.
One word of caution however is needed in this case. Since now the basis G is common to all the sharings the security of the scheme is based on the semantic security of ElGamal over a composite when the message space is all of Z NB .
Efficiency. The protocols are very e cient especially for Alice. We summarize the computational requirements of the protocol in Figure 7 reporting upper bounds on the number of modular exponentiations (in Z NB ) required by each player. The numbers in parenthesis represent the numbers under normal operation of the system (i.e. no-fault mode).
The storage requirements for the proxies are as follows. A share of the signature S is basically the ciphertext A S ; B S plus the shares of the secret key X. In RSA-V S-1 this totals to 5 log N B ) which is optimal. In RSA-V S-2 the share size is 3n log N B . This is not optimal because of the multiplicative factor of n due to the share-backup approach in TEG-Key-Gen.
Sharing a DSS signature
The Problem. Recall the DSS signature scheme. The public parameters are a large prime p, a 160-bit prime q that divides p ? 1 does not go through, although they claim heuristically that it is secure. Our Approach. We show that a careful adaptation of the ElGamal V S from 20] can be shown to be secure. Alice gives out r in the clear to the proxies and shares = s ?1 via Feldman VSS using the basis G = g m y r (which the proxies can compute on their own from g; y; m; r). Notice that by doing this she reveals r = G mod p. So in order to check that the shared value is really the correct signature the proxies must simply check that r mod q = r. Notice that revealing r (i.e. the value of r before the reduction modq) does not turn into a security problem since this information is easily simulatable (see the proof).
Indeed the reduction modq of r serves only to shorten the signature and has no security purpose (this was also noticed in 23] and in 43]). The full protocol appears in Figure 8 .
A remark about fault-tolerance. By using Feldman's VSS with the extra complaint phase we achieve fault-tolerance t for n > 2t. Security relies once again on simulation. Assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary corrupts the rst t proxies. The simulator S on input p; q; g; y; m works as follows. It chooses a random k 2 Z q and computes r = g k mod p and r = r mod q. It simulates Feldman's VSS with G = g m y r as basis and r as the public commitment to the secret being shared. I.e. it generates t values 1 ; : : :; t at random in Z q . De ne by f(z) = P t i=0 a i z i the tdegree polynomial in Z q such that f(0) = DLog G r and f(i) = i . We cannot reconstruct the coe cients of f(z) unless we solve discrete log, but we can compute the values i = G ai mod p via \interpolation in the exponent" (in particular 0 = r ). The simulated view of the adversary is de ned as the t shares 1 ; : : :; t and the public values 0 ; : : :; t . It is easy to see that the simulated view has the same distribution of the real one. Informally an undeniable signature needs the cooperation of the signer to be veri ed. This may be useful in scenarios in which the signer wants to have some control on the distribution of authenticated data (e.g. software, where the signer wants to collect a licensing fee from users). An undeniable signature comprises three components: a signing algorithm, a conrmation protocol that allows the signer to con rm legitimate signatures and a disavowal protocol that allows the signer to prove that an alleged signature is false. An undeniable signature is called convertible if the signer can publish a short piece of information to convert all undeniable signatures in publicly veri able ones. In 10] a general paradigm was proposed to implement convertible undeniable signatures. The signer chooses a traditional signature scheme S with public veri cation key V K and secret signing key SK. He also chooses an asymmetric encryption scheme E, publishes the encryption key EK and keeps the decryption key DK private. To undeniably sign a message m, the signer publishes C S = E EK (S SK (m)) i.e. an encryption of the signature. Then one adds ZK proofs to prove or disprove that the ciphertext contains a valid signature. To convert the signatures it is su cient to publish DK. In 10] e cient protocols were presented for ElGamal-like signatures but not for RSA ones.
Our techniques yield an e cient RSA-based undeniable scheme that follows the 10] paradigm. The signer uses RSA to sign and the ElGamal over the same composite to encrypt the signature. The con rmation protocol is EGRSA-ZK-Proof shown in Figure 4 . The disavowal protocol is described in Figure 9 . It needs to be repeated`times to achieve probability of error 2 ?`, however this is OK for the denial protocol since it will be invoked rarely. Notice that all the prover needs to know in order to participate in either the con rmation or the denial protocol is the decryption key X (which means that the signer can delegate both functions to someone else, and still reserve to himself the power to sign.)
The protocol in Figure 9 is only honest-veri er ZK since a cheating veri er could learn information about a ciphertext (A R ; B R ) which she did not generate. To make it ZK against any veri er standard techniques may be used: the prover would not reveal the answer b directly but he would rather commit to it. Then the Veri er would show that she constructed In 26] the rst RSA-based undeniable signature was presented. Our scheme is less e cient than 26] and also relies on more assumption (e.g. the security of the ElGamal encryption).
EGRSA-ZK-Denial
Secret input for the Prover: The decryption key X. Input for all: The message m, the signer's RSA public key N B ; v B , the encryption public key G; Y = G X , the alleged encrypted signature (A S = G K ; B S = Y K S). In 42] the concept of binding cryptography was introduced. In a binding public-key cryptosystem the sender encrypts a message under both the public key of the receiver and the public key of a third party and prove in (non-interactive) ZK that the two ciphertexts contain the same message. In 42] a scheme for binding ElGamal was presented but the problem of binding RSA left open. The main motivation of 42] was to establish a fraud-detectable key-recovery system: the third party would be a key recovery agent and because the proof is publicly veri able fraudulent messages would be detected. In 37] however an attack is presented in which two cooperating players can produce seemingly binding ciphertexts that would not be decrypted by the key recovery authority. If at least one of the parties is honest, 37] notices that much more e cient solutions can be devised by having the receiver check that the key recovery agent can indeed decrypt. This seems to deprive this approach of its main application area. However it is possible that in other models the binding approach may still be interesting. Consider for example a model in which the receiver wants his ISP to check that incoming encrypted messages are lawfully constructed and does not want to spend valuable resources by doing the check himself. In general binding cryptosystems could still be useful in other areas because of their interesting structure.
Our RSA V S scheme can be used to construct binding RSA public key encryptions. Bob's public key for encryption is (N b ; e B ) and the third party uses an ElGamal key (N B ; G; Y = G X ). If Alice wants to send a message m to Bob using a binding cryptosystem she would encrypt m twice constructing A = G K , B = Y K m and C = m eB mod N and prove in ZK that the message contained in C is the same as the message contained in (A; B) . She can use the proof in Figure 4 for this purpose (where C is the message and m is its secret signature). The proof can be made non-interactive in the random oracle model, by computing c via a suitable hash of the theorem statement (N b ; e B ; G; Y; A; B; C) and of the rst message of the proof (r; A R ; B R ).
7 Conclusion and an Open Problem.
We presented new, e cient and provably secure V S protocols for RSA, Rabin and DSS signature schemes. This problem was open since the introduction of the concept of V S in 20] as their RSA/Rabin protocols were subsequently broken and their DSS protocol was not provably secure. Various applications of our results have also been presented. We leave the reader with an open problem: our RSA V S scheme is provably secure under an assumption which is not known to be weaker than the RSA assumption itself. It would be nice to have an RSA V S scheme which is provably secure just under the RSA assumption.
A Threshold Cryptosystems
A public key scheme E is de ned by three algorithms: Key-Gen key generation: a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and returns a pair (EK; DK) where EK is the public encryption key and DK is the secret decryption key.
Encrypt takes as input a message M and the public key EK and returns a ciphertext C also denoted as E EK (M). Decrypt takes as input a ciphertext C = E EK (M) and the private decryption key DK and returns M. A threshold cryptosystems T E for a scheme E distributes the operation of key generation and decryption among a set of n parties P 1 ; : : :; P n . That is, T E is de ned by two protocols: T-Key-Gen a randomized protocol that returns as public output the public encryption key EK and as private output for player P i a value DK i such that DK 1 ; : : :; DK n constitute a t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing of DK. T-Decrypt each player P i takes as public input a ciphertext C and as secret input his share DK i and returns as public output a message M For any adversary A that corrupts at most t players the following conditions must be met: correct key generation T-Key-Gen generates keys with the same a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from Key-Gen.
correct decryption on input C = E EK (M), T-Decrypt returns as output M simulatability Recall that we de ne the view V of the adversary A during a protocol as the set of messages sent and received by the bad players during a run of the protocol. Consider an execution of T-Key-Gen that generated Y as an output followed by executions of T-Decrypt on input C i and output M i . Let V be the view of the adversary during that protocol. Then there exists an algorithm S called the simulator which on input Y; C i ; M i and black-box access to A produces output strings with a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from V.
